The log names the integration, not the agent.
The write is attributable to a service user, not to the agent run that caused it.
Agent identity audit
Find out which agent made the write.
A free, written audit of one MCP write path. A one-page memo in 72 hours. No call.
For teams shipping remote MCP servers with write tools. I’ll show where two agents collapse into one identity, what your audit log misses, and how to revoke one agent without rotating the integration.
No credentials. No production data. No SDK required for the audit.
audit-preview
# one write path
tool create_invoice
tenant acme
user ap-reviewer-17
actor svc_sap_connector
agent ?
revoke rotate connector
# what the log shows
service account + user
no agent run
Illustrative example. Not a customer result.
Written audit
Not a call
One write path
One tenant
72 hours
After five answers
No access
No credentials
01 · The gap
Two agents. One service account.
Two agents look identical.
The same user, tenant and tool can produce the same audit row.
Revoke means rotate.
Removing one agent often means rotating a shared credential and breaking every other agent.
If you cannot answer “which agent made this write?” from the audit event, this audit is for you.
02 · The memo
One-page memo. Five answers.
No platform tour. No 40-slide deck. One page about one write path.
72 hours after the five answers
01The one write path we reviewed
02What the audit event contains today
03Where two agents become one identity
04How revoke works today
05One change to test
06Pilot: yes or no
03 · Sample
What the audit looks like.
The one-page memo shows the current flow, the observed audit row, the gap, one test, and the revoke path. Redacted, for one write path.
Illustrative example. Not a customer result.
# current flow
agent -> MCP -> service account -> ERP
# observed audit row
actor: svc_erp_connector
user: ap-reviewer-17
agent: absent
# gap
two agents for one reviewer are indistinguishable
# test
add a short-lived agent credential; verify agent_id
# revoke
now: rotate connector
target: revoke one agent, keep the connector
04 · Process
Three steps. No call.
Send one write path
Tool name, tenant model, current auth. No credentials.
Answer five questions
By email. No production data. No call.
Get the memo
One page in 72 hours. If a pilot makes sense, the next step is written.
05 · Fit
Who this is for.
For
- MCP agencies and system integrators
- B2B SaaS with a remote MCP endpoint
- Salesforce / SAP agent partners
- Platform teams with multi-tenant agents
Not for
- Read-only MCP servers
- IDE-only plugins
- Teams looking for a penetration test
- Anyone who needs SOC 2 before a sandbox
06 · Proof
See the mechanism, not a logo wall.
07 · FAQ
Questions before the form.
Is the audit really free?
Yes. One write path, one page, 72 hours. It is a qualification step, not a full security review.
Do you need access to our MCP server?
No. I need the tool name, tenant model, current auth, and answers to five questions.
Do you need production data or credentials?
No. Never send credentials, production records, or customer data.
Is this a sales call?
No. The audit is written. If a pilot makes sense, the scope and success line are written too.
What if we only have a read-only MCP?
This audit is for write paths. A read-only server does not have the attribution problem we test.
What do you need from us?
One write tool, the current auth model, and five short answers. That is enough for the first page.
What happens after the audit?
You get the memo and a yes/no on a seven-day sandbox pilot. No obligation.
08 · Request
Send one write path.
I’ll send five questions, then a one-page memo. No call. No credentials. No production data.
What to send
- The tool name
- The current auth model
- A docs link or one redacted audit row
No source code, credentials, or production data.
One write path per audit
One-page memo in 72 hours